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Introduction
Philosophers have fixed on the underlying geometry of space as a prime instance of the underdetermination of theory by evidence. Attention is usually directed to the metrical structure of space. As the argument goes, any non-Euclidean metric would be empirically equivalent to a Euclidean metric provided that there were appropriate universal forces to yield the observed 'inertial' trajectories. Quine gives the case as an instance of underdetermi- 
A brief preliminary
Underdetermination is sometimes taken to be the same as the problem of empirically equivalent rival theories, but let's think in broader terms. 1 To put it crudely, we can say that underdetermination obtains when scientists are unable to responsibly decide which theory to believe. That is, the choice between rival theories is underdetermined if scientists cannot make a responsible choice of one over the others. Underdetermination is thus always relative to some standard for what will count as responsible theory choice. For specific cases of underdetermination, it is also helpful to distinguish the scope of the case-the range of circumstances across which responsible choice is impossible. In order to impress us, a case of underdetermination should obtain between rivals we take seriously, according to a standard that we find reasonable, and with a scope that includes not only our present circumstance but also most any circumstances we can expect to find ourselves in.
Thinking of underdetermination in this way allows us to represent it as a 1 In §4.3, we'll see reasons not to think of the problem discussed here as a case of empirically equivalent rivals.
three-place predicate: Choice among a set of rival theories T is underdetermined by standard R with respect to scope S. We can then represent specific underdetermination claims using this predicate and appropriate quantifiers.
In the next section, I will offer a simple illustration where the rival theories are about the topology of space-in §4.4, we will see that analogous worries can be raised about the topology of spacetime. Prima facie, the case is one in which no possible observations could decide between the rival topologies.
It seems as if the choice between the rival topological theories is underdetermined by reasonable scientific standards with a scope that includes all naturally possible circumstances.
Cases like this are sometimes offered as evidence for more widespread underdetermination; that is, for the claim that the choice among all or most rival theories is underdetermined in a similar way.
Around the universe in 80 days
Imagine you board a rocket ship and fly in a straight line away from Earth.
After some time, you find yourself approaching Earth-or so it seems. It's a blue-green planet orbiting a yellow sun, matching the planet you left behind to any discernible degree of detail. You might think you've flown in a circle, but you check your instruments and conclude that indeed you've gone in a straight line away from Earth. Is this planet Earth? How could you tell?
Let S 1 be the theory that space is a finite cube wherein opposite sides are identified, such that anything reaching the top side would emerge on the bottom, anything reaching the back would emerge on the front, and anything passing to the right side would emerge on the left.
2 If S 1 were true, then the planet would be Earth. Like the astronaut in figure 1, you'd have flown away from Earth and arrived back there.
Let S 2 be the theory that space is a finite volume with its contents repeated twice over. Space is connected as in S 1 but is larger, such that when you arrive at this blue-green planet you've made it half-way across the universe. If S 2 were true, you'd have arrived at the likeness of Earth and not at Earth itself. The situation would be like figure 2.
What could you do to decide between S 1 and S 2 ? You might retrace your path to Earth and ask if you'd been seen coming the other way-if they saw you from Earth, then your journey had taken you to Earth and you could Figure 1 : In finite space, the intrepid spaceman travels directly away from his planet only to arrive back home.
Figure 2: Space is larger but still finite. The intrepid spaceman travels directly away from his planet to arrive at an identical planet, while an astronaut leaving from the other planet travels to the first spaceman's home.
conclude that S 1 was correct. Yet how could they be sure it was you that they saw? If S 2 were true, the other planet would be an exact likeness, so it too would have sent out a rocket ship. Your friends on Earth would be unable to tell whether it was you or an indistinguishable likeness they had seen.
It looks as if your choice between S 1 and S 2 might be underdetermined for any evidence. Of course, you might entertain theories S 3 , S 4 , S 5 , . . ., in Figure 3 : In infinite space, the intrepid spaceman travels to one of an infinite series of identical planets while an infinite number of other astronauts do the same.
each of which space is larger than in the last and there is one more planet sending out one more rocket. You may even entertain the limit case, S ω , in which space is infinite and there are an infinite number of indistinguishable planets launching an infinite number of rocket ships; see figure 2. If the problem is indeed underdetermined, then they will not have reasonable grounds to decide whether S 1 is true or not. They may adopt a fideist position and believe one of the members of S on faith, or they may adopt an agnostic position and refuse to affirm or deny any of the members of S.
Indexicality
If the former, they should welcome you if they are charmed by S 1 but arrest you otherwise. If the latter, their choice is not so easy. Although they don't wish to believe any member of S, they are forced to act toward you in some way or other. They might reason in this way: Since no considerations could favor a member of S over any of the others, then they should assume that the members of S are equiprobable. 5 They know that if S 1 is true, then you are their hero, but if some other member of S is true, then you should be arrested. S 1 is measure zero in S, so they may safely ignore that possibility.
You are arrested for trespassing in the night, and you are forced to sell your rocket ship to pay legal fees. Tragic, no? 
Simplicity itself
It seems that in order to avoid arrest, you must show that the choice between members of S is not underdetermined and that S 1 is to be preferred. You note that if S 1 describes the universe as having m objects in it, then S n describes the universe as having n · m objects. Invoking Occam's Razor, you conclude that S 1 wins out. Yet the prosecutor may insist that Occam's Razor applies to kinds rather than to individuals and note that the ontological excess of S ω consists of more things but no more kinds. He insists further that infinite space is sufficiently simpler than unbounded, finite space to justify believing that space is infinite whenever possible. Thus, he concludes, S ω is to be preferred. Insofar as simplicity is an underanalyzed desideratum, it is unclear what the jury should make of these appeals.
Empirical equivalence
It may be tempting at this point to say that philosophers already have a category in which to file cases like this one: 'If members of S are adequate to the phenomena, then there is no way to decide between them. They are all empirically equivalent.' Unfortunately, this is simply untrue given any usual sense of empirical equivalence.
It is traditional to say that two theories are empirically equivalent if they entail all the same observation sentences. Evaluating the empirical equivalence of the members of S requires dividing observation sentences from other sentences. This has always been a contentious issue, but suppose that an observation sentence is one that describes observable objects; colloquially, it describes things you can get your hands on. 7 Given S 1 , you can truly say upon arriving to the planet, 'Here is Earth.' Given any other member of S, you cannot make this observation. So with observation sentences characterized in this way, the theories would entail different observation sentences and so ipso facto would not be empirically equivalent.
We might instead follow Quine [Qui75] and adopt a behaviorist conception of observation sentences. On Quine's account, two theories are identical if they share all the same empirical consequences and are intertranslatable. 8 It is easy to see that S 1 and S n (for some n) will count as the same theory for
Quine. To translate from S 1 to S n , map the predicate 'x is my Earth' onto 'x is some earth,' and so on. But if these are no distinct rivals, there cannot be any choosing between them and a fortiori no underdetermination of that choice.
So if we try to assimilate this example as a case of empirical equivalence, something very strange happens: The members of S either count as empirically inequivalent or they count as all being the same theory. Neither outcome captures the underdetermination that seems to obtain between them.
One might think that the problem here is the sentential treatment of empirical equivalence. Suppose we instead follow van Fraassen [van80] , who considers theories to be sets of models or structures, and call theories empirically equivalent if they have the same observable sub-structures. Now, the planets in each of the members of S are observable, so each of the theories has different observational sub-structures. S 1 has a solitary planet Earth, S 2 has a pair of distinct planets 'Earth', and so on. Thus, the theories are not empirically equivalent. This consequence could be avoided by specifying the members of S in a language without an identity predicate, but then the theories will be satisfied by all the same models-they would be the same theory and not genuine rivals. Thus the same unhappy outcomes obtain if we understand empirical equivalence semantically rather than sententially.
The problem of reduplication does not fit well into the rubric of empirical equivalence: If the rivals come out as distinct, they count as empirically inequivalent. So, the choice simply cannot come out as underdeterminednot because you could decide between the members of S, but because the rubric of empirical equivalence is not up to the task of describing the case.
Were you to make this rocket journey, you would find such an analysis to be frivolous logic chopping. The sense of underdetermination developed here can make sense of the underdetermination in this case, providing a strong reason to favor it over the usual story about empirical equivalence.
Is this just a philosopher's fantasy?
One might respond to this example by noting that it is purely hypothetical.
If you travelled away from Earth and found an Earth-like planet then you would be unable to decide between the members of S. The antecedent is a fanciful narrative, so we should not get too excited about the consequent. An argument that relies on a complicated, counter-factual scenario shouldn't lead us to expect underdetermination all over. The case is uninteresting-one might say-not because the choice fails to be underdetermined, but because the underdetermination follows from features of the spectacular, fictional case.
This reply simply won't do. The example of your rocket journey is simpler than actual cosmology in several respects, of course, but similar difficulties may arise in the context of relativistic cosmology. You will never get in a rocket ship and travel across the universe, but spacetime might be multiply connected in detectable ways. The remainder of this section will discuss physicists' attempts to make these determinations.
At the end of the 19th century, Karl Schwarzschild suggested that we might look for distant images of our own galaxy [Sch00] . Suppose we looked out with our telescopes and saw images of the Milky Way repeated out into infinity-the astronomical equivalent of the astronautical scenario above.
We might think either that a distant galaxy strongly resembles our galaxy or that, because of the geometry of space, a galaxy that appears to be in the distance is our galaxy. Schwarzschild explains:
One could imagine that as a result of enormously extended astronomical experience, the entire Universe consists of countless identical copies of our Milky Way, that the infinite space can be partitioned into cubes each containing an exactly identical copy of our Milky Way. Would we really cling on to the assumption of infinitely many identical repetitions of the same world? In order to see how absurd this is consider the implication that we ourselves as observing subjects would have to be present in infinitely many copies. We would be much happier with the view that these repetitions are illusory, that in reality space has peculiar connection properties so that if we leave any one cube through a side, then we immediately reenter it through the opposite side. [Sch00,
He identifies an intuition that infinite repetition without identity is absurd.
9
Yet this reassurance carries no logical force, and the absurdity of infinite repetition is not a manifest contradiction. S ω is consistent and as much in agreement with the imagined evidence as S 1 . Nothing Schwarzschild says disarms the prima facie underdetermination between S 1 and S ω . He speaks elsewhere in the essay of what is true or real, but here he speaks of our happiness with a certain view. This suggests fideism: Because the choice between S 1 and S ω is underdetermined, we may believe whatever will make us happiest. Schwarzschild says nothing further to dispel the many worries one might have about this resolution to the problem.
10
One might hope that the problem is a relic of the 19th century, swept away when classical space was replaced by relativistic spacetime. No such luck.
11
Even in the relativistic context, we could follow Schwarzschild's suggestion and scan the heavens for multiple images of single objects. Admittedly, attempts to identify multiple images of the Milky Way face considerable obstacles. Because the images that travel further would take longer to arrive, 9 He thinks we would find finite space reassuring, since it would give us the prospect of having surveyed all of space just as we have surveyed all the Earth.
10 As I argue in [Mag] , fideism might disrupt the scientific community or lead scientists to develop poor habits of thought.
11 Luminet, et al. provide an excellent informal introduction to these issues [LSW99] .
the images we could see now would portray the Milky Way at different times. There is no denying that work being done in this area is ingenious, but 12 Hopefully, these effects would blunt rather than eliminate the spike in the histogram. 5 Move along. . .
One might think that the underdetermination reveals epistemological dry rot at the core of contemporary cosmology. That would surely be bad, but it wouldn't be a cause for general alarm if the example only showed something about cosmotopology. Given examples of underdetermination, though, some philosophers are quick to generalize and assume that the dry rot lies beneath the whole edifice of since. In this section, I will argue that such a generalization would be unjustified. In the next section, I will return to the example specifically and argue that worries are unjustified even there.
Suppose, though, that the example did exhibit a single instance of un-derdetermination. Perhaps we could look around and find a few other cases like it. Then, as John Earman writes, "the production of a few concrete examples is enough to generate the worry that only a lack of imagination on our part prevents us from seeing comparable examples of underdetermination all over the map" [Ear93, p. 31]. This worry plays on our suspicion that there is nothing special about the theory choices considered and found to be underdetermined, a suspicion that would incline us to think that this case is representative of underdetermination that hides everywhere.
Yet this same underdetermination cannot be all over. To see why, consider physical geometry stripped of any indexicals-call this non-demonstrative geometry. It would be a catalog of things and spatial relations: A planet of a certain local description is in such-and-so a configuration with respect to planets of identical local descriptions, and so on. (Following Strawson, I presume that removing the indexicals will eliminate any meaningful notion of numerical identity. If this is not the case, then it will be necessary to remove the identity predicate.) All members of S have the same non-demonstrative geometry. The possibility of massive reduplication is insufficient to make our choice of non-demonstrative geometry underdetermined. We may not be terribly interested in non-demonstrative geometry, but that's beside the point.
It's enough to show that the underdetermination of physical geometry on account of possible reduplication doesn't show that all theory choice is underdetermined. Why should we suppose that other scientific theory choices are more like the choice of a physical geometry than like the choice of a non-demonstrative geometry?
Perhaps one still has an inchoate worry, but it becomes easy to sympathize with Kyle Stanford. Regarding each "hard-won particular alternative to an existing theory," he says "surely one or even a few such convincing cases do not provide sufficient warrant for concluding that genuine or serious empirical equivalence is a ubiquitous phenomenon!" [Sta01, p. S6] 6 . . .nothing to see here
Note that a demonstrative geometry requires both a specification of the underlying geometry and a rule of repetition. Each member of S (except S 1 ) presumes a law-like connection between events on each of the Earths that preserves the reduplication: Each planet sends out an astronaut, each astronaut behaves in the same way, and so on. Since S 1 posits only one Earth, it does not require a rule of repetition. Note also that the underlying topology of space in S 1 and S 2 is the same; each is a torus. Since S 2 requires this topology and a rule of repetition, S 2 is just logically stronger than S 1 . Thus, S 1 will always be better confirmed. 13 Applying the same reasoning, S 1 is to be preferred over S 3 , S 4 , · · ·.
In this way, we can dispose of all the S n 's for 1 < n < ω. Since S ω has a different topology than S 1 , it remains in contention. This justifies Schwarzschild's intuitions that S 1 and S ω are the only real contenders. How can the physicists' implicit preference for S 1 be motivated? There has, historically, been a presumption of infinite, simply connected space (the topology of S ω ). Since geometry has come to be an empirical matter, both simply connected and multiply connected space are contingent possibilities. The crucial difference isn't there.
S ω posits an infinite repetition of the entities posited in S 1 , and the difference between S ω and S 1 amounts to the difference between believing or not believing in infinite repetition. That is the crux of the matter; if scientists have good reasons for eschewing claims of infinite repetition, then they have good reasons for preferring S 1 .
13 There may be reasons to prefer logically stronger theories in some cases (e.g., if they are predictively more accurate), but no such reasons are present here.
Rules of repetition
S ω 's requirement of infinite repetition amounts to a causal constraint that the infinitely many copies of each thing will behave in the same way.
14 It's easy to see that a law of infinite repetition is either a sui generis kludge or a sceptical fantasy.
Relativity prohibits superluminal influences-that is, it's impossible to send a message at faster than the speed of light. 15 Yet, given S ω , you could send a message instantaneously across space. Imagine you arrive at the next planet and want to send a message home. A radio message would take a very long time to cover that distance. So, instead, you write a message on a piece of paper. Now you drop the paper on the ground. The folks back home will not receive your sheet of paper-since it stays with you on the doppelganger Earth-but they will receive your message. Because of infinite repetition, another astronaut drops a similarly-marked sheet of paper on your planet Earth. You've sent the message instantaneously and without only a 14 Reichenbach makes a similar point, remarking that "the topological properties of space are closely related to the problem of causality; we assume a topology of space that leads to normal causal laws" [Rei58, p. 80, emphasis in original].
15 A different way of seeing the conflict: Relativity is usually taken to prohibit a general answer to the question of whether two space-like separated points are simultaneous; simultaneity is relative to reference frames. However, infinite repetition stipulates that what is happening here is happening in the same way just at this moment on all the other Earths. Thus, S ω picks out a preferred reference frame, the frame in which repetition occurs. modicum of effort.
The situation is even worse than that. If S ω were true, it would be possible to send these superluminal memos without ever leaving Earth. Supposing that sending a message involves an intention to communicate coupled with an appropriate action, you can send a message in this way: Form the intention to send a greeting to adjacent copies of yourself, write the 'Hello!' on the back of an envelope, and then read what you've written. The salutation, although inscribed by your hand, is actually a message from a far-away alien planet. The mind boggles.
This gives scientists good reason to reject S ω .
Some possible replies
One might try to defend S ω by noting that quantum mechanics is also nonlocal. Since physicists accept quantum mechanics, why not infinite repetition? Although the relation between relativity and quantum mechanics is a complicated subject, 16 the cases are very different. First, we have independent reasons for accepting quantum mechanics. It has been successful in many experimental domains. Second, experimental results preclude a local 16 Maudlin [Mau94] provides a thorough discussion of these issues.
alternative to quantum mechanics. S ω has no independent motivation, and there is a local alternative (viz., S 1 .) Third, although quantum mechanics picks out a preferred reference frame metaphysically, it does not do so epistemically. There is no way we could learn which reference frame is preferred. 17 Determining the preferred reference frame in S ω is trivial. Finally, quantum mechanics does not allow for super-luminal messaging. According to S ω , as we've seen, superluminal messaging should be child's play.
One might defend rules of repetition in a different way. In a deterministic universe, repetition need not be posited as a persistent causal law. Rather, it might obtain on account of special initial conditions: the contents of the universe were repeated i times over at the beginning. Yet, a peculiar initial condition of this kind is as odd a duck as a law of infinite repetition. Perhaps it is even the same duck; given a regularity or best-system conception of laws, then special initial conditions of this kind just are laws. 18 This is especially apparent when you consider that such an initial condition would designate a preferred reference frame, just as surely as a causal law of repetition would.
One might instead object that we have no way of knowing that the world is not held together with perverse sui generis relations. Yet this just underscores the fact that underdetermination is relative to some standard. Given a standard that demands deductive certainty, the choice between the members of S will be underdetermined-but that standard would yield scepticism about most of science! Any standard of ampliative inference that warrants non-trivial conclusions will rely on background knowledge in some way.
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Given present background knowledge, this means that it will warrant rejecting laws of repetition.
Conclusion
The topological structure of space is an interesting case because the possible underdetermination can be presented in an intuitive way. I've argued that the matter really isn't underdetermined and (even if it were) there is no conclusion about all or most of science that follows from it. Along the way, I
provided and deployed a characterization of underdetermination richer than those that define it in terms of empirical equivalence. The argument thus both resolves the underdetermination in this case and provides a reason to think of underdetermination using this richer characterization. 19 Norton [Nor03] makes a general argument for this claim.
